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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing concern about such national. and international problems
as population, po ,rerty, and pollution, and recognition that science and
technology are both major causes and possible solutions of such problems
have called into question the capacity of legal process to exercise its
traditional control functions. 1 Especially intense, the Congress' concern
has centered upon better flows of intelligence and better structural mech-
anisms for assessment of technological applications. 2 Both the problem of
supplying Congress with intelligence needed for policy making respect-
ing technological applications, and the problem of , designing adequate
mechanisms for Congressional assessments of technological applications are
embraced by the concept, Technology Assessment Function (TAF).
1	 '
Consider the pessimism in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics
(1963) , p. 344.
2
Louis H. Mayo, The Technology Assessment Function, Part I, Internal
Reference Document 25 (Washington, D.C.: Program of Policy Studies in
Science and Technology, The George Washington University, July 1968),
pp. 1-5; Lear, "Predicting the Consequences of Technology," Saturday
Review, March 28, 1970, p. 44; Lear, "Technology's Assessors," Saturday 	 r
Review, April 25, 1970, p. 52; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Technology Assessment, statement of Emilio Q. Daddario,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Commit-
tee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), Committee
Print; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Establish
a Select Senate Committee on Technology and the Human Environment Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on
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The burden of this paper is to explore the contribution of advocacy
to the Technology Assessment Function of legal process, particularly of
Congress. For this purpose additional background of TAF and more precise
conceptions of advocacy are needed.
The TAF should be distinguished from technology assessment and from
technology. While for this paper a precise definition of technology is
not needed, to avoid constriction to the common image of hardware, Dean
Harvey Brooks' suggestion that "technology consists of codified and
reproducible ways of doing things derived from ra; ional principles'3
should be borne in mind. In the practice of technology assessment, of
Government Operations, Senate, on S. Res. 78, 91st Cong., lst Sess.,
March 4, 5 9 6, April 24, and May 7, 1969; U.S. Congress, House, Committee
on Science and Astronautics, Technical Information for Congress, Report
to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee
on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative
Reference Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office) April 25, 1969 (hereinafter cited as Technical Informa-
tion for Con ress); National Academy of Sciences, Technology: Processes
of Assessment and Choice, Report to the Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.) July, 1969 (herein-
after cited as Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice); National
Academy of Engineering, A Study of Technology Assessment, Report of the
Committee on Public Engineering Policy to the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.) July, 1969
(hereinafter cited as A Study of Technology Assessment); U.S. Congress,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Toward a New Diplomacy in a
Scientific Age," Science, Technology and American Diplomacy, Report to
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments
of the Committee on Forei r a Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess;, prepared by the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs
Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office) April, 1970 (hereinafter cited as
Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age).
3
Brooks, "National Science Policy and Technology Transfer,"
Proceedings of a Conference on Technology Transfer and Innovation,
National Science Foundation, NSF 67-5, May 15-17, 1966, pp. 53-54.
•r
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course, technology is defined by the choice of the applications to be
assessed, and this choice necessarily reflects the purpose for which an
assessment is being made.4
Technology assessment is a process of inquiry directed toward
iderrifying the effects (past, present, and future) of the application
of a particular technology, evaluating the effects thus identified,
developing alternatives for changing effects, and appraising the benefits
and costs of each alternative. 5 It includes the step of defining the
technology and the applications of the technology whose effects are
assessed. It also includes appraisals of the impacts of assessment sys-
tems. Technology assessment may take the form of policy research. Tech-
nology assessment taking this form is the particular focus of this paper.
The Technology Assessment Function (TAF), as conceived by Mayo,
"refers to technology assessment activities -- in some instances to the
4
On the problem of defining technology, see Mayo, The Technology
Assessment Function, Part I, supra, note 2, pp. 6-10.
5
On definitions of technology assessment, see Technology Assessment,
Statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, supra, note 2, pp. 12-14; and Mayo,
The Technology Assessment Function, Part I, supra, note 2, pp. 10-21.
As conceived by Daddario, page 14, technology assessment includes the
following seven sequence steps: (1) place the technology within the
total societal framework; (2) identify all impacts of a ;grogram; (3)
establish cause and effect relationships where possible; (4) determine
alternative methods to implement the program; (5) identify alternative 	 i
programs to achieve the same goal and point out the impacts; (6) measure
and compare sums of good and bad impacts; and (7) present findings from
the analysis.
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6
totality of activity involved with technology assessment."	 TAF
is broader than technology assessment, although the latter is a part
thereof. When technology assessment takes the foam of policy re-
search TAF is in the service of intelligence or appraisal or both
functions of legal process, depending on whether prospective or past
or both prospective and past applications of a technology are under
consideration. 7 While Congressional concern with TAF appears to be
focused upon improving its intelligence function respecting appli-
cations of technology, 8 the findings and recommendations of appraisals
constitute welcomed feed-back intelligence.
Advocacy is conceived as a multi-dimensional concept. Perhaps its
most easily recognized, generally understood, and pervasive dimension
is the presentation to legal process of claims/demands that authorita-
6
Mayo, The TechnoloU Assessment Function, Part Is supra, note 2,
p. 22. Mayo has also developed the following subsidiary concepts of
TAF: mechanism, process, sub-system, system, and structure. At pp.
22-23.
7
The reference here to intelligence and appraisal functions of
the legal process is to the conceptions found in McDougal, Lasswell,
and Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Deci-
sion," 19 J. of Leg. Ed. 403 9 421 9 436 (1967).
8
"Our goal is a legislative capability for policy determination in
applied science and technology which will be anticipatory and adaptive
rather than reactionary and symptomatic." Technology Assessment,
statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, supra, note 2, p. 15.
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tive decisions be made, or accepted, 9 allocating values in designated
ways. 10 This dimension, stressing practice or technique, conceives
of advocacy as a strategy for influencing decisional outcomes of legal
process. 7iewed in terms of its objective of affecting the exercise
of discretionary power, therefore, the strategy of advocacy is pur-
posive, non-neutral, and value (power)-oriented behavior. But, while
advocacy is power-oriented, the outcomes it seeks may involve the
allocation of any and all types of values. Finally, the base values
(effective means) manipulated in strategies of advocacy may consist
of any and all types of values.I'l
Another conception of advocacy is of a mode of inquiry designed
into a decisional system. Adjudicatory systems and constitutional
requirements of checks and balancing are obvious examples. 12
9
I include "or accepted" in recognition that a claimant might
seek to obtain acceptance (legitimation) of a decision already made.
Advocacy in behalf of legitimation is not limited to advocacy by
citizens to legal process, but includes advocacy by legal process to
citizens (as, for example, appellate court opinions advocate the
legitimacy of their decisional outcomes).
10
Compare: "A demand may be defined as an expression of opinion
that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject
matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing
so, "in Easton, A System Anal sis_of . _	 .Political Life (1965), p.38,
with Lasswell an Kaplan,, Power an oc ety	 pp. 16-19.
11
The concept of advocacy presented here is not rc: 	 ..'I to
conflict situations as in Schelling, The Strategy of Co --_.+ct (1963)
p. 5; nor is it restricted to the use and threats of force.
12
Other examples are the Cabinet, conference committees of Con-
gress, the Republican (or Democratic) Policy Committee, Joint Chiefs
V
M
6r
B
As a mode of inquiry advocacy may be designed into a decisional
system to assist any of its basic functions. More commonly, however,
advocacy is intended primarily to assist the intelligence function of
decisional systems.
While this paper will draw mainly upon conceptions of advocacy as
strategies of claimants and as modes of inquiry, there are other dimen-
sions. A basic decisional function of legal process, the recommendation-
promotion function, is a functional conception of advocacy. 
13 
It may
also be conceived ars a set of multi--lateral coordinating controls, as
contrasted with hip -.rarchical, pyramidal, and unilateral modes of
coordinating community life. 
14 
Viewed in terms of basic goals of a
democratic society it is conceived as a means of sharing power. It
also may be conceived as the expression of an ideology. 15
The order of presentation of this paper will be, First, to develop
some of the salient features of the contexts in which TAF and advocacy
occur in legal process; second, to develop conceptions of adequate
assessment; and, third, to explore the potential contributions of
advocacy to TAF in legal process. In developing cLatexts, I will adopt
of Staff, National Security Council, Congressional party caucuses, add
political parties. See Lindblom, Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in
Government, Im. 1434-1tc, Rand Corporation, 22 Feb. 1955.
13
See the definition of promotion in McDougals. Lasswell and
Reisman, supra, note 7, p. 421.
14
See Lindblom, supra, note 12, pp. 2 9 6-7, 28-29.
15
See Griffiths, "Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third 'Model'
of the Criminal Process," 79 Yale L.'J. 359 (1970).
r7
the perspective of a scholarly observer. In developing criteria of
adequate assessment and in suggesting potential roles of advocacy in
TAP, however, I am trying to contribute to the public order system
of a body politic explicitly aspiring toward human dignity. In these
latter capacities therefore I shall not try to be neutral but shall
openly promote the goals of a democratic society as I see them.
t
•
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II. CONTEXTS; CONDITIONS OF TAF AND ADVOCACY
Applications of technology usually become pertinent to legal pro-
cess in one of three ways. First, applications may be a causal agent
accounting partly or entirely for a problem brought to legal process
for functions of legal process as, for example, introduction of com-
puters and information systems into a decisional entity of legal pro-
cess may modify its intelligence function and reallocate decisional
power. 'Third, legal process may use technology to assist performance
of one or more of its functions. -Fcr example, the use of scientific
devices L:o detect crime would aid invocation functions, and the use of
technological tests, such as blood tests, as evidence in trials would
aid application functions.
As the above very general classification suggests assessments of
technological applications are made in a variety of contexts of legal
process under varying conditions that determine in some degree their
quality. The Department of Agriculture may undertake an assessment
of the application of a pesticide to growing crops. A committee of
the Congress may undertake an assessment of the outcome of the
Department of Agriculture's assessment. Or the committee may assess
the assessment system utilized by the Department to assess pesticide
applications. Assessment of the Department's assessment system may
go beyond evaluating the quality of its outcomes and include separate
assessments of each internal operation and each external relationship
of the system. The committee of the Congress may attempt a total
impact or total problem assessment including an effort to synthesize the
outcomes of all other assessments of pesticide applications to growing
S
I
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crops. Further, an assessing entity may be the ultimate decision maker, or
an assisting arm of the ultimate decision maker (as is true of committees of
the Congress), or more or less structurally independent of the Congress).
Finally, an assessing entity may be located in any of the major structures of
legal process (executive, administrative, legislative, or judicial), and an
assessment may be aimed at facilitating performance of any aild all of the
basic decisional functions of legal process (i.e., intelligence, recommenda-
tion, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination). 16
Since it pervades legal process TAF necessarily occurs in an impressive
variety of contexts. Pervasiveness and contextual variety are also charac-
teristic of advocacy in legal process, whether advocacy is conceived as the
strategies of claimants or as modes of inquiry. To demonstrate the charac-
teristics and highlight the most salient features of context and conditions
of advocacy in legal process discussion will focus upon the following ques-
tions:
1) Who participates in advocacy in TAF in legal process?
2) What are the significant perspectives of the participants; that
is, who do they represent and with who are they identified; what value-de-
wands do they present, and with what expectations are such claims presented?
3) Where and under what circumstances does advocacy respecting TAF
occur in legal process; that is, in what forums, arenas, or situations, for-
mat and informal, structured and programmed in varying degrees, does ad-
vocacy in TAF occur in legal process?
16
For definitions of basic decisional functions see McDougal,
Lasswell, and Reisman, supra, note 7, pp. 417-437.
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4) What base values (effective means) for the achievement of
goals are at the disposal of participants in advocacy respecting TAF
in legal process?
5) In what manner are such base values (effective means) employed
by advocates to influence decisional outcomes?
6) What impacts upon the value allocations and decisional func-
tions of legal process result from advocacy respecting TAF?
7) What are the effects upon society of assessment processes and
outcomes influenced by advocacy?
1. Participants
Because few aspects of life go untouched by technology virtually
everyone at sometime presents claims to legal process respecting actual
or potential technological applications. The number of advocates of
a claim varies with the nature of the claim (in particular, the
inclusiveness of the values at stake). As the number of potential
advocates increases representative rather than personal advocacy may
be required. Moreover, the existence of an organized group with com-
petent spokesmen may determine whether claims are in fact presented.
For this reason the poor, the disadvantaged, small businessmen, and
small farmers often lack an advocate: The problem of numbers is also
related to the problem of identifying potential claimants. Unless
they can be identified there may be no effective way of notifying
claimants that action is being considered which may affect their values.
Participants in advocacy respecting technological applications in-
clude officials charged with decisional responsibility. Officials are
f- 11 -
not and cannot be neutral respecting the responsibilities entrusted
them. 17 Their decisions must be responsive not only to the claims of
other participants but to legal process and to society. Officials
often advocate to one another. Senators advocate to Senators and to
the Senate as a whole; Representatives advocate to Representatives
and to the House of Representatives as a whole. The Senate and House
of Representatives advocate to Each other. The Congress advocates to
the President, executive and administrative bodies, and to the courts* 18
Judges of appellate courts advocate positions to one another and to
the court as a whole. 19 Judicial opinions are strategies of advocacy
aimed at enlisting support for decisional outcomes from the public in
general and particularly from critical evaluators of the court's work.
More generally, a major function of the constitutive order is to pro-
vide basic rules for participation in legal process (i.e., rules
17
".	 the legal system in all its elaborate byways is immersed
in policy and politics, which, taken together, constitute the social
process. All who people the institutions of legislation, execution,
enforcement, judicial settlement and interpretation are involved in
a process of bargaining among individuals and interest groups. All
to some degree can bend the austere logic of the legal code to
maintain certain values of yield to new claims by insurgent interest
groups." Nieburg, "Violence Law, and the Informal Polity," 13 J. of
Conflict Res. 192, 199 (1969).
18
".	 the agencies advocate programs; the Bureau of the Budget
protects the President's interest by limiting the advocated programs;
the House Appropriations Committee guards public funds by further
restricting the advocated programs; and finally, the Senate Appro-
priations Committee serves as a responsible appeals court for unsatis-
fied claimants." A. Wildaysky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(1964) 9 P. 160. It should be noted that the quoted passage tends to
equate advocacy with adjudication and judicial procedures.
19
Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964).
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respecting recruitment s terms of office, succession, etc.), thus
determining who is permitted to advocate.
Participation in advocacy respecting technological applications
often is conditioned by the ability to gain access to a decisional
arena. Since such arenas have "gate-keeping" functions 20 and since
advocacy constitutes an input into a forum, claimants commonly must
meet various tests of entry defined by such doctrines as "jurisdiction",
"standing", "ripeness", "exhaustion of remedies", "sovereign immunity",
"primary jurisdiction", "final order", "rule-making", "adjudication",
etc. 21 The actual and potential contribution of advocacy obviously
is dependent in some degree upon these and other structural mechanisms
defining access to decisional forums.
The nature of the problem to be dealt with in a decisional arena
partly determines the participants presenting claim to it. Pro-
spective impacts of decisions differ according to the number, extent,
and duration of the values and institutions to be affected. Such
factors, in turn, condition motivations to undertake advocacy and
partly determine the nature of legal process' need thereof. From a
purely rational standpoint the nature of the problem to be dealt with
defines the inputs of intelligence required to resolve it and the
participants whose advocacy might supply such inputs. Technical
problems, for example, may require the advocacy of technicians. From
20
Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965), pp. 85-99;
Lezar, "Economics and Administrative Process," Duke L.J. 518, 520-22
(1964) .
21	
Q^
On tests of entry focused upon - problems allowed to enter judicial
1
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another point of view the nature of a decisional problem may require
measures to enlist sufficient support for an outcome to assure its
social acceptability and political feasibility. Affording opportunity
for participation in advocacy may contribute to both of these ends.
2. Perspectives
Claims-demands are presented in the name of an advocates ego-
identity or in the name of a larger self with which his ego is
identified. Hence, it is possible to assess advocacy in terms of the
degree to which it is inclusive (embracing wide identities) or ex-
clusive (embracing narrow identities), and according to the degree to
which it assets common as distinguished from special interests.
Demands are conditioned by an advocate's expectations about the
past, present, and future. Presentation of a claim implies, for
example, the expectation that advocacy has or may have some influence
upon decisional outcomes. Contrariwise, advocates may forego resort
to a decisional arena because of expectations respecting it. 22 Of
course a claim expected to be denied may nevertheless be presented to 	 .
a decisional arena as necessary step for gaining access to another
arena in which a favorable outcome is expected. The style dimension
of sdvocacy is obviously dependent upon the level of crisis within
arenas, see Wells and Grossman, "The Concept of Judicial Policy-Taking:
A Critique" 15 J. of Pub. L. 286, 302 (1966). See also Note: "The
Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment," 55 Corn. L. Rev. 861,
863-65 (1970).
22
For example, a tribunal may not be respected. See Katz, The
Relevance of International Adjudication (1968) pp. 32-34.
•i
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which it occurs. 23 The expectations of advocates are as diverse as the de-
mands and identifications with which they are connected.
As previously noted advocacy in legal process is power-oriented in
seeking to influence decisional outcomes; yet the outcomes it seeks may in-
volve the allocation of any and all types of values. 24 Demands that decision
makers be replaced or that a decision making structure be reorganized, for
example, are demands for ,authoritative allocations of power, and demands that
legal process make certain information available are demands for enlightenment.
The intensity with which demands are held and asserted can be of great im-
portance, not only as an indication of the degree of frustration experienced
by claimants but also for the fruitfulness of advocacy as a process of inquiry.
Even the claims presented to legal process respecting technological applica-
tions by a single claimant are not necessarily consistent. Moreover, ours is
a pluralistic society and doctrines, folklore norms, and myths commonly in-
yoked by advocates tend to appear as pairs of polarized opposites. 25 The
consequence that arenas of advocacy must cope with conflicting, intensely held
and asserted demands, and with incommensurable values, requires that special
care be taken to avoid the distortions of analysis which advocacy can introduce.
f
1
23
"The most sensitive crisis involves physical combat, and includes
battles, uprisings and riots. Many of the occasions on which policy is
enunciated are exceedingly tense, as when verdicts are announced or sentence
passed.	 ," Lasswell, Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics, (1949)
p. 22.
24
Supra, Text P. 37.
25	 ^
That dichotomous formulations may create illusory problems see Dror
0r
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3. Situations
Claims respecting technological applications are presented in a
concrete context of conditions, including time and place. Such situa-
tions (which I will sometimes call forums or arenas) vary greatly in
legal process. A protest by a homeowner to a zoning board against a
request by a polluting industry to be allowed to locate nearby, a
letter to a mayor demanding enforcement of traffic ordinances, and
assertion to a legislator that severance taxes should be imposed on
extracted minerals are each situations in which advocacy about tech-
nological applications occurs.
Arenas display considerable differences in structure depending on
whether found in legislative, administrative, executive, or judicial
processes, and upon the level or such processes at which located. Even
adjudicatory arenas, although typically specialized to the application
of prescriptions, vary greatly in structure from process to process and
among levels within a process. Decisional arenas also reflect the
specialized functions to which they are adapted. Thus the structures
and procedures of arenas differ according to whether they are specialized
to intelligence, recommending, prescribing, invoking, applying, termi-
nating, or appraisal functions of legal process. Such differences
inevitably condition the role of advocacy. The degree to which a forum
is programmed (in the sense that its outcomes are controlled by pre-
arranged variables), and thus the extent to which discretion is delegated
Specialists vs. Generalists: A Miss- uestion, P-3997, The Rand
Corporation, Dec. 1968.
r- 16 -
to decision makers have an obvious impact on advocacy. As discretion is re-
duced by increased programming the need of advocacy is reduced (except with
respect to design and programming); while as discretion is increased by re-
duced programming the need of advocacy is increased.
As a long-range trend situations for advocacy respecting technological
applications rapidly have grown in number, type, and complexity. Consider,
for example, the proliferation of administrative agencies with regulatory
tasks respecting technological applications. Moreover, another long-range
trend has seen arenas for advocacy undergo drastic restructuring, commonly
because of the volume but also because of the novelty of demands arising out
of technological applications. The clogging of court calendars with claims
arising from automobile accidents and the development orientation given to
the law of torts are obvious examples.
Situations are related to who participates as advocates. Quite often
ease of access to forums is defined by characteristics of the situation such
as time, place, and credentials required of advocates. Presumably improved
access to arenas leads to wider participation in advocacy respecting tech-
nological applications. Presumably, too, arrangements of situations may
make important contributions toward safeguarding processes of persuasion and
decision from disruptive side-effects of advocacy, while permitting advocacy
f
to make its optimum contribution to the intellectual tasks essential to
policy making and implementations 26
26
That situations for advocacy might contribute to extr_erational pro-
i
i
i
0
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4. Base Values
Since advocacy respecting technological applications consists of
strategies for influencing decision making, and since strategies
necessarily employ means to achieve their ends, the base values avail-
able for advocates to manipulate condition the contribution advocacy
27
can make. Although of obvious importance wealth resources are not
the only nor, indeed, always the most important values for advocate
manipulation.
Power is an important base for advocacy. Contests between the
Congress and the President involve opponents with vast power. Given
enough power and ruthlessness in its exercise advocacy gives way to
decision by fiat. Some modicum of power, for example, assistance
of an organization competent to undertake advocacy, may determine
whether it is undertaken at all.
The effectiveness of advocacy may be dependent upon the advocate's
knowledge and understanding. Access to a flow of needed intelligence
commonly is essential for effective advocacy. As a minimum the ad-
vocate must know the time and place to present his claims; and it is 	 ,
usually critical that he also knows the procedural requirements, the
nature of the problem, and probable contentions of other advocates.
ceases of decision making and to aggregative functions of legal
process, see Dror, Public Policy-Making Reexamined (1968).
27
Bonfield, "Representation for the Poor in Federal Rule Making,"
67 Mich. L. Rev. 511 (1969).
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The effectiveness of advocacy is also partly determined by the
skill or competency of advocates. In some arenas only professionals
certified as having a minimum degree of skill and enlightenment are
allowed to present claims. Often, however, even representative (in
behalf of others) advocacy is not restricted on the basis of com-
petency. And in many, if not most, arenas anyone may advocate his
own cause. In general, more highly structured and formalized arenas
presuppose higher levels of skill in advocates. Styles of advocacy
show distinctive differences from arena to arena. While skill in
advocacy embraces the use of words having desired emotive content,
rhetorical. cadence, figures of speech, appealing tones, gestures, and
deportment, it also extends to each component of "purely" rational
problem solving. For example, skill in portraying and gaining
acceptance of an image of the problem to be resolved is a most ef- 	 I
fective means of advocacy.
The respect that an advocate commands, and the respect that he accords
to his opponents and to decision makers may condition his effectiveness.
Similarly, his fidelity to standards of right and wrong, and his skill
in invoking such standards in support of his claims may be of critical
importance. While the importance of affection as a means of advocacy
may appear to be minimal in more formalized arenas, it is quite visible
in less formalized situations. Even the highly stereotyped styles of be-
havior of formal arenas may fail to mask the fact that peer group and
collegial relationships among advocates and decision makers commonly
are colored by affectionate regard. Finally, the physical and psychic
N
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well-being of an advocate is an essential. Fear of one's life if an
unpopular claim is voiced may suppress its presentation.
The critical importance for effective advocacy of the base values
at the disposal of advocates indicates that the design of any decisional
system that includes advocacy as a mode of inquiry should s gsure the
provision of adequate base values for advocacy.
5. Strategies
Since advocacy involves the manipulation of base values in support
of demands, it is limited by the base values at its disposal. Moreover,
certain strategies of advocacy, such as bribes and force, may be banned
in particular arenas.
Strategies of advocacy vary along several dimensions. They are
not necessarily limited to efforts to persuade to voluntary outcomes,
but include also efforts to achieve compulsory and involuntary out-
comes. If a decision maker's discretion is limited, advocacy may in-
clude manipulating base values so as to convince him that there is no
reasonable or even possible alternative other than that desired by the
advocate. The location of a particular strategy on a persuasion-
coercion continuum is, of course, a factual question controlled in
part by the problem-context and by the effects of that strategy upon
its targets.
Strategies also differ in style, and in accordance with the nature
of the decisional problem, the nature of the decision maker, and the
decisional situation. Styles of advocacy in highly structured, formalized
rr
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arenas, such as the United States Supreme Court, may be quite ritualized. 28
To the extent that an arena is specialized to the use subsumption (deduc-
tions from doctrinal principles) models of decision making strategies must
be tailored to this form of reasoning. Decisional problems respecting tech-
nological applications usually require technological expertise and put a
premium upon strategies maximizing the persuasiveness of expert witnesses.
Finally, decision makers engaged in prescribing functions need strategies of
advocacy addressed to each of the components of the policy choices with which
they are confronted.
Strategies are not limited to the manipulation of symbols, but include
reinforcement of verbal claims through manipulation of resources. 29 Even if
outlawed manipulation of non-verbal resources may occur in some degree. Strate-
gies also may be classified according to the principal base value manipulated
(as diplomatic, ideological, military, or economic), according to effects upon
targets, according to targets, and according to the emotive-intelligence con-
tent of its symbols. Each of these classifications may of course contribute
to the understanding of the role of advocacy respecting-technological appli-
cations.
6. Outcomes
Outcomes of legal process are decisions to allocate values in particular
ways. All such outcomes are in themselves advocacy of the allocations they
28
Respecting some functions of ritualism in advocacy see Neiburg, supra,
note 17, pp. 205-206.
29
For reinforced strategies of advocacy available to a justice of the 	 I
Supreme Court see Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964).
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provide for. The impact of strategies of advocacy upon outcomes, on the
other hand, is a factual matter reliably answered, if it can be, only by
properly designed and executed empirical inquiry.
Outcomes are more or less specialized to decisional functions-of legal
process. Rather than expressing these functions in the traditional, organic
categories of executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial the seven
more discriminating categories of outcome formulated by McDougal, Lasswell,
and Reisman3d will be used. The task is to relate the role of advocacy, both
as presentation of claims and as mode of inquiry, to outcome functions of
intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination,
and appraisal as they bear upon technological applications.
(a) Intelligence
Assuming that intelligence is defined as "the gathering, evaluation',
and dissemination of information relevant to decision-making, prediction
based on the intelligence derived and, in some cases, the planning for
future contigencies 1131 does advocacy play a role in this function? I
submit that it does, probably always, regardless of the decisional arena
being served. Th__s is an obvious conclusion respecting adjudicatory arenas,
it is submitted that advocacy is a part of the intelligence function serving
such forums.
In the first place the intelligence function of legal process, re-
gardless of the arena involved, is a servant of power. No matter how
34
Supra note 7, pp. 413-437
31
McDougal, T.asswell, and Reisman, su ra, note 7, p. 417.
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divorced from deliberate factual distortion and from recommendations
of particular policies, intelligence functions exist to serve the needs
of legal process for a rational basis for policy making and implemen-
tation. 'Consequently the information it gathers, processes, and
disseminates is not mere data; it is data conceived as relevant for
policy making and implementation. Policy making implies some con-
ception of a problem, identification of the values at stake, models of
trends and conditioning variables, alternative solutions, and pre-
dictions of their consequences for value gains and losses. Since
these components of policy making transcend scientific notions of
objectivity and require a merger in decision of both factual-scientific
and normative standpoints 32 discretion and thus advocacy are neces-
sarily involved.
Consider, for example, the concept of a problem for policy making.
Such a problem is not merely something objectively given. Apart from
someone engaged in the act of perceiving and evaluating events as
problematic a problem would not exist. In problem perception existing
conditions, preferred future conditions with which existing conditions
reflect the image or mental set of the perceiver. 33 Necessarily,
therefore, problem perception is selective, formulations of problems
reflect the value orientation of formulators, and advocacy plays a role.
32
Technical Information For Congress, p. 12.
33
. . without falsifying a single fact, entirely contradictory
descriptions can and often are given of persons, situations, social
orders, etc., by selecting (often subconsciously) only the features
which suport preconveived notions." Rapaport, Fights, Games and
Debates, (1960) p. 258. See also Boulding, The Ima a (1956).
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Similarly, identification of values at stake in resolving a pro-
blem requires the use of value criteria. While an analyst may use a
set of criteria authoritatively prescribed for him, he must interpret
and apply that set. Process of interpretation &ad application of
authoritative language almost always involve in some degree the dis-
cretion and personal values of the interpreter and applier, hence
advocacy by him.
While the task of fashioning models of trends and conditioning
variables implies the standpoint of a detached, scholar-scientist
observer, it is approached through the observor's discipline. Dif-
ferent disciplines use different approaches and fashion different
models. Within the same discipline the views of experts may be
sharply contradictory. Finally, the models required for policy
making in legal process often outrun scientific and scholarly know-
ledge, forcing decision makers to rely on common sense assumptions
'	 and extrarational guesstimates. Discretion and advocacy inevitably
enter an analysis under such circumstances.
Identification and invention of policy alternatives calls for an
effort to be creative. If the search is for the alternative with
maximum net gain the analyst offering an alternative advocates that
it merits consideration under this criterion. If the 'search is for
a satisfactory alternative, analytical effort is directed toward
criteria of satisfaction, laying claim to and hence advocating such
values. Finally, the predictive component of policy making often
transcends scientifically valid predictive techniques. In consequence
discretion and advocacy necessarily enter.
r--24-
A second reason why advocacy is characteristic of an intelligence
function is that that function in legal process often is not separated
and insulated from the promotion function. In such cases intelligence
becomes quasi-promotional, which is to say advocative in nature.
A final reason why advocacy characterizes intelligence functions of
legal process may be developed by considering the case of "pure" re-
search as a cource of intelligence. Even if such research is under-
taken under circumstances allowing the inquiror maximum independence
in design and execution, and even if these tasks are performed in pre-
vise compliance with the most rigorous tenets of scientific method, it
is submitted that advocacy necessarily enters the process. Research is
purposive, value-oriented behavior. As such it lays claim to certain
values. The tenets of scientific method reflect a partisan belief and
preference for a research strategy and set of controls. 
34 
True the
strategy and set of controls aims at assuring certain qualities in re-
search outcomes. But this is to say that the strategy and controls are
aimed at achieving not only the value, enlightenment, but preferred
qualities of that value. In this sense, therefore, the pure researcher
is partisan toward his product, its quality, and his methodology. This
34
The tenets of scientific method constitute a set of normative
standards, deviation from which may be followed by sanctions applied
by colleagues and peers. Moreover, scholar--scientists compete vigor-
ously for recognition (and Nobel prizes) . See Watson and Crick, T, he
Double Helix (1968) .
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conclusion is believed to apply even if a researcher confines his
inquiry to description and search for explanatory variables, de-
liberately refraining from addressing normative issues.
(b) Promotion
Defined as going "beyond passive recommending to active advocacy
of policy alternatives to authoritative decision-makers" promotion
and advocacy are one and the same. 35 Formulation of promotion as a
function reflects the dependence of legal process upon advocacy both
as strategies of claimants and as part of a design for inquiry.
(c) Prescription
f1Prescription refers to the projection of policy for value shaping
and sharing accompanied by coordinate expectations of authority and
control. 1136 As previously noted each of the policy components of a
prescription is pervaded with discretion and permeated with advocacy.
Furthermore, communication of the authority of a prescription and of
control intentions to sustain it clearly involves a demand for con-
formity thereto. From this point of view, legislative enactments,
35
"A personality system can be said to perform an inner promotional
activity when intensity of demand is added to expectations. The par-
ticipants in a decisional process promote when they project their in-
tensified demands to authoritative prescribers. Hence, promotion is
a pressure operation aimed at getting authoritative and controlling
results. Its objective is to transform promoter's demands into
group prescriptions." McDougal., Lasswell, and Reisman, sum a note 7,
p. 421.
36
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 7, p. 423.
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opinions of adjudicatory bodies, in fact, all official communication
of policy constitutes advocacy in behalf thereof.
(d) Invocation
The invoking function involves "the provisional characterization
of facts as deviating from prescribed policy and the provisional as-
sertion of control to prevent or abate the deviation or to seize con-
trol of individuals or values necessary for subsequent application." 37
Since invocation involves the presentation of claims, all participants
in invocation are advocates of the claims they assert. Participation
in invoking functions is not limited to officials of legal process.
Private citizens participate by signing warrants for arrest, by placing
matters on agendas of prescribing arenas, and by filing complaints with
adjudicatory arenas.
(e) plication
Defined as the "transformation and concrete implementation of pre-
scription into controlling event"38 application is ubiquitous in nature
and thus characteristic of all -arenas. It is therefore not limited to
adjudicatory arenas or to adversarial procedures. All use of statements
of prescription to justify decisional outcomes is not only application
but advocacy of the outcomes and value allocations which outcomes
effectuate.
37
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 7, p. 427.
38
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 7, p. 429.
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(f) Termination
The termination function is concerned "with the abrogation of ex-
tent prescription and provisions for claims arising from disruption of
an expected and demanded arrangement." 39 Examples are the repeal of
statutes, cancellation of contracts, and denunciation of treaties.
Since, with the exception of the concern for amelioration, the process
of termination parallels that of the process of prescription, although
with a focus upon putting an end to rather than upon creating, much
of what was said above 40 about the role of advocacy in prescription
functions also applies to termination functions. The prospect of
terminating a statute, for example, raises questions about each com-
ponent of the policy judgment embodied therein and thus creates an
occasion and need for advocacy. Furthermore a policy of amelioration
is in part advocacy in support of terminations.
(g) Appraisal
The appraisal function looks toward "assessing thP. degree of suc-
cess of authoritative policies in realizing perceived 	 goals and
imposing responsibility and sanctions for discrepancies between them." 41
The function includes reporting findings and making recommendations.
39
McDougal, 'Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 7, p. 432.
40
Supra, text pp. 16-19
41
McDougal., Lasswell, and Reisman, supra note 7, p. 436.
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Recommendations (promotion) are, as we have seen, advocacy. Since
technology assessment functions in legal process often are concerned
with past or present applications of technology - in which case TAF
is an appraisal function - the role of advocacy in appraisal functions
is of particular concern in this paper.
Appraisals of past or present technological applications can never
be completely devoid of advocacy. The effects of a technological
application must be traced or shown to be causally related to that
application before they can be assessed. Tracing effects in a highly
interdependent society seldom can be performed with the disciplined
controls of scientific method. Often a scientific method of performing
the tracing operation does not exist. Moreover, even if a scientific
method of tracing is available elements of discretion - hence advocacy -
inevitably enter its use. That a "consensus" exists among scientists
respecting the impact of applications of a technology does not establish,
necessarily, that advocacy did not enter into the formation of the con-	 '
sensus. On the contrary, it may indicate only that the participating
scientists agree with the judgment of a reporting researcher--advocate
and thus advocate its scientific soundness.
Moreover, advocacy enters other steps of an appraisal. When traced
effects are evaluated they are compared to criteria of appraisal. Cri-
teria of appraisal are embodiments of policy preferences, and, as such
imply conceptions of the desirable. Conceptions of the desirable are
a type of advocacy; and criteria of appraisal derived from such con-
ceptions are presented in advocacy of their suitability as standards of
	 R
appraisal. Finally, standards of appraisal must be interpreted and
6
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applied to traced effects. Interpretations and applications of policy
criteria are rarely, if ever, so devoid of judgment that advocacy does
not enter.
7. Effects
There is little systematic knowledge about the influence of assess-
meet processes and outcomes, shaped in part by advocacy, upon society.
This is of course a facet or a more general lack of systematic knowledge
about the impact of legal process upon society. 42 The point is, however,
that the lack of systematic knowledge about the impact of assessment
practices and outcomes of legal process upon society stimulates advocacy
respecting such effects. Moreover, since effects are projected and
evaluated with value-standards, and since the use of such criteria implies
their appropriateness for Fuch purposes, advocacy enters the projection
and evaluation of effects. Finally, since decision makers constantly
strive to cause effects engendering support of themselves and of their
decisional outcomes, and since effects may either engender or detract
from support, the management of effects tends to become a form of advocacy.
In sum, advocacy is pervasive of legal process and of TO in legal
process. In fact advocacy appears almost ineR' ,Lable. 43 1 shall contend
42
Respecting the state of research on the impact of judicial decisions,
see The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions_ (Becker, ed. 1969) ; "Law and
Social Change, 13-Am. Beh. Sci. 485 (Symposium, 1970); and all issues of
the Law and Society Review.
43
Advocacy is inevitable, according to Bauer, because since we lack a
method for determining a "best" policy our "only two alteratives
are . . . delegation to or usurpation . . . by small groups of persons,
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that it is also highly desirable, with the qualification that measures
sometimes are needed to guard against undesirable side-effects of ad-
vocacy. Before exploring the contrioutions of advocacy to TAF, however,
criteria of adequate technology assessment need to he developed.
III. TOWARDS CRITERIA OF ADEgUATE ASSESSMENT
The pervasiveness and contextual variety of assessments by legal
process of technology defies efforts to formulate a single, generally
applicable and suitable set of criteria of adequate assessment. These
characteristics also caution that adequate criteria need to be related
to the principal features of the contexts in which assessment occurs.
Accordingly the discussion which follows will be organized around the
44
seven contextual questions previously presented.
1. Participants
The principal questions which criteria of adequate assessment must
answer respecting this contextual feature are 1) who should be par-
ticipants; and 2) upon what conditions should participation be extended?
Respecting the first question, the pluralism of American society and its
or	 negotiation among interested parties." Since delegation and
usurpation succeed merely in postponing the time when negotiation occurs,
advocacy is "at the heart of the policy process." Bauer, "The Study of
Policy Formation: An Introduction," in The Stuff of Policy Formation,
(Bauer and Gergen, eds. 1968) pp. 1, 13. To the Science Policy Re- 	 }
search Division of the Library of Congress political "truth" is a con-
sensus established through advocacy. Technical Information For Con-
gress, p. 5.
44
See Text, supra, pp. 6-7
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commitment to democratic ways of life ,justify a presumption that all
persons presently affected and all persons likely to be affected by a
technological application or by the outcome of an assessment of that
application, including members of unborn generations, are entitled to
be participants. In short, an open forum approach to assessment would
be a general criterion. As stated the criterion is intended to include
the provision of reasonable access to participation, and participation
includes each of the phases of an assessment.
A variety of circumstances may require, however, that the open forum
criterion be qualified by limitations upon participation. For example,
the number of potential participants may be so large as to require that
participation be restricted to a smaller number of representatives.
Representation is of course the only way that unborn generations can
influence on assessment. Since advocacy first presented after issues
have crystalized and interests have consolidated is often futile, the
timing of participation is of critical importance. Appropriate timing
is assured under the open forum criterion because participation is
extended to each phase of assessment.
The nature of questions to be resolved in an assessment may in-
dicate that the participation of some people would contribute little or
nothing to their resolution. For example, the average layman could
contribute little to the resolution of a question concerning the state
of the art in detection of radioactivity. It does not follow, of course,
that the same laymen should not participate in other issues of that
assessment. Participation might be restricted to issues which may be
enlightened thereby.
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The jurisdiction and basic decisional functions emphasized by
particular forums may restrict the number of participants and extent
of participation. All adjudicatory arenas, because specialized to
application functions and because using adversary models of procedure,
engage in highly restrictive "gate-keeping" respecting both partici-
pants and problems. Openness in participation is limited accordingly.
2. Perspectives
Criteria for participation in assessments by legal process should
not overlook the significance of the perspectives of participants. The
inclusiveness of identifications of participants is so critical that
special measures often are needed to assure its presence. For example,
the measures may be needed to assure participation by ecologists known
to represent future generations as well as living mankind, and known to
have more. comprehensive viewpoints. Moreover, measures may be needed
to assure that common and not merely special interests are presented.
It cannot be assumed, for example, that the officials conducting an
assessment are spokesmen for all social values. On the contrary, the
legal responsibilities of such officials may require them to act as
i
spokesman for special interests.
Finally, it is important that participants expect that their par-
ticipation may influence, significantly, the outcome of an assessment.
Without such an expectation contributions may cease or deteriorate. 45
45
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". . . officials tend to remain advocates only if their responsi-
bilities are important enough for them to have a significant effect
on major policies in their areas of specialization. Advocacy requires
great expenditures of time and energy in the effort oto win support. Al-
i4P
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For the same reasons it is also important that participants expect that
assessment will be made with integrity, and that the grou7d rules of
participation will be honored.
3. Situations
The diversity of the settings of assessment makes the task of
formulating criteria of adequacy most difficult. In general, however,
legal criteria governing an assessment setting would also be appropriate
criteria of adequacy of assessment. For example, constitutional law
doctrines governing a committee of the Congress engaged in an assessment
would constitute appropriate criteria of the adequacy of its assessment.
Not all legal criteria governing an assessment setting, however, would
be appropriate criteria of adequacy. For example, legal criteria may
permit a high secretive proceedings. This would of course violate some
criteria of adequacy which I have proposed for participants and for
perspectives. Criteria of adequate assessment setting should of course
support the criteria of adequacy of other phases of assessment. The de-
sign of an assessment setting, for example, might contribute toward the
provision of reasonable access to participants.
The adequacy of assessment settings may also be evaluated in terms
of such standards as timeliness of notice of proceedings, sufficiency
of notice of proceedings, communicative efficacy of notice of proceedings,
though an official naturally inclined to be an advocate will make
such expenditures in any given position for a while, he will not
keep on doing so indefinitely unless he believes they will do some
good." Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (1967) p. 108.
Ar
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scope of issues permitted to be raised, adequacy of decisional standards
to be applied, nature of participation permitted, and the degree of
support of the setting by basic decisional functions. Respecting the
last criterion (support of the setting by basic decisional functions),
because of limitations dictated by adversary procedures the intelligence
functions supporting adjudicatory arenas are often less than adequate. 46
4. Base Values
Technology assessments involve a process of inquiry. The efficacy
of any process of inquiry is conditioned by the avAilability and suit-
ability of its means of inquiry. Many persons affected or potentially
affected by technological applications or by the outcomes of assessments
of technological applications lack knowledge thereof, or lack the skill
required for persuasive presentation of their claims, or lack the organi-
zational support needed to make their claims influential, or lack the
financial resources to engage skilled representation, etc. 47 The actual
impact of participation upon assessment outcomes is believed to be
conditioned by all the values (power, wealth, skill, enlightenment, re-
spect, recitude, affection, and well-being) which participants deploy in
strategies of advocacy. If this beliefs is sound criteria of adequacy
46
For an excellent analysis of the limitations of policy making in
adjudicatory arenas, see Wells and Grossman, supra, note 21.
47
See Bonfield, supra note 27; Nonet, Administrative Justice: Advocacy
and Change in Government Agencies (1969) pp. 66-97; Friedman, "The Limits
of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court," 116 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 1156 (1968) .
4
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of assessment should include standards of adequacy of each base value
available as an effective means for participants. This prescription
also applies to the base values available as effective means for par-
ticipation by assessment officials. For example, the lack of power
of judicial officials to make an assessment until a case allowing
this to be done is brought to them points up an inadequacy of judicial
assessment. Criteria of adequacy of base values might also include a
standard of proportion. That is, an assessment might be deemed in-
adequate because a disparity between the effective means available to
participants is judged to have skewed its outcome.
5. Strategies
Since strategies of persuasion are preferred over strategies of
coercion, a general overriding criterion of the adequacy of assessment
is the degree to which strategies of persuasion rather than of coercion
influenced its outcome. Coercive strategies include subtle ways of
overpowering the minds of other participants and decision makers, as
well as the use of force and violence. 48 For example, masking claims
under scientific, religious, supranatural and metaphysical rubrics,
concealing elements of personal preference and judgment, and under-
cutting rational thinking with overpowering authority are coercive stra-
48
Wilensky cites Altshuler, The City Plannin& Process: A Political
Analysis (1965), for the following: ", . 	 the apparent clarity of
technical standards of the engineers (traffic service and cost) and
their sense of rectitude overwhelmed less-focused and less-coordinated
interests and beliefs." Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, (1967)
p. 164 at footnote 60.
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tegies. Moreover, because customarily used to maintain distance, height,
remoteness, superiority, or command styles of advocacy using "effect-
contrasting" techniques 49 may be quite coercive. This is the character-
istic style of depotism. 50 The setting of an assessment also be con-
sidered in applying the persuasion-coercion criterion. Highly austere
and authoritative forums - such as judicial forums - may be quite
coercive to many participants.
A corollary of the persuasion-coercion criterion is the criterion
of minimal rationality. Strategies should contribute to rational
decision making by officials of legal process. While participants
may, and should, advance their own claims, rational analysis is promoted
when rival claims and analysis leads assessment officials to search for
inclusive, balanced outcomes stressing common rather than special interests.
Moreover, strategies should develop in a clear and orderly way each of
the components of a policy decision. 51 Finally, strategies should not
exaggerate, underplay, or otherwise distort rational formulations of each
component of policy making.
49
Effect-contrasting styles, uses, symbols, and signs that contrast
with the effect sought by the communicator, as "when a holy man blesses
the kneeling multitude." Lasswell, Leites, and Associates, Language of
Politics (1949) p. 21.
50
Lasswell, Leiter, and Associates, supra, note 49, p. 27.
51
See Mayo and Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Processes: Alternative
Thinking and the Predictive Function 33 Geo, Wash. L. Rev. 318, 349-51
(1964). See also Downs, supra, note 45, pp. 175-76. i
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Assessment outcomes may be intended as inputs to another and ultimate
decision making arena. As an input outcomes may be intended to assist
any or all of that arena's basic decisional functions; intelligence,
recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and
appraisal. Hence, criteria appropriate for evaluating the ultimate
decision maker's performance of these functions might be made to serve
as criteria of strategies by asking whether they contributed to or
detracted from the ultimate decision maker's conformity with its per-
formance criteria.
6. Outcomes
What characteristics of a completed process of assessment are
reliable indicia of the adequacy of the outcome? Assessment outcomes
constitute intelligence when directed toward future applications of
technology; appraisals when directed toward past or existing applications
of technology or when directed toward existing assessment systems; and
in any case include, expressly or impliedly, findings and recommendations
for policy making and implementation. Consequently, criteria of adequacy
of outcome may consist of criteria of adequacy of the intelligence,
appraisals, and recommendations constituted by outcomes.
Consider, first, outcomes constituting intelligence. Assessments
may produce outcomes of intelligence to assist resolution of a particular
problem of policy, or to assist a decisional entity's performance of
its intelligence function in general. On the first assumption, criteria
of adequate intelligence for resolving particular policy problems could
also serve as criteria of adequacy of assessment outcome. The adequacy
of intelligence for resolving particular problems of policy is, of course,
•38 _
a function of the nature of the problem, the nature of the decision maker,
the nature of the decisional forum, and other features of the decisional
context. Nevertheless, all decision making logically implies a set of
components of choice. Elsewhere Mayo and I have presented a theory of
these components which we called the Basic Decisional Model. 
52 
The
components of BDM might serve as appropriate criteria of the adequacy
of intelligence for resolution of particular problems of policy.
On the assumption that the intelligence produced by an assessment
outcome is to assist a decisional entity's performance of its intelligence
function in general, criteria of adequate performance of the intelligence
function by that entity could also serve as criteria of adequacy of assess-
meet outcome. As suggested by McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman such criteria
might be: dependability, comprehensiveness, contextuality, availability,
53
economy, and openness of participation.
Turning now to assessments constituting appraisals, assessment-
s.	 appraisals may be aimed at assisting a decisional entity's appraisal
of the impact of a particular policy, or at assisting a decisional entity's
performance of its appraisal function in general. On the first assumption,
52
Mayo and Jones, supra, note 51, pp. 349-51.
53
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra, note 7, p. 417. Wilensky
proposes the following criteria of the intelligence function: clear,
timely, reliable; valid; adequate, and wide-ranging. Wilensky, supra
note 48, at viii-ix.
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if an appraisal is to assist a decisional entity's appraisal of the impact
of a particular policy, it must perform, adequately, certain tasks. It
must define what is to be appraised. It must also trace (establish cause
and effect or probability relations) and describe the consequences of
the policy. Since it is impracticable and impossible to trace and
describe all consequences a conception of relevant consequences must
be formulated in terms sufficiently operational to serve as a guide
in tracing and describing effects. An appraisal must also posit or
accept a set of standards for evaluating quality (value gains and losses)
of effects traced and described. 54 Finally, if an appraisal is to
assist a decisional entity's evaluation of the impact of a particular
policy, reports of its "findings" (includes definition of the problem,
tracing procedures and data and conclusioe.s derived therefrom, conception
of relevant consequences, description of effects, standards of quality,
and applications of such standards) must be included.
The adequacy with which each of the foregoing steps are performed
might serve as criteria of adequacy of assessment-appraisals of the impact
of particular policies. If an assessment-appraisal also includes recom-
mendations, since they would become part of the intelligence available
to the decisional entity being assisted, they should conform to the
criteria of adequate intelligence previously stated for resolving
particular problems of policy.
54
For a suggested set of standards for evaluating the effects of a
Congressional Policv see Technical Information For Congress, supra note
2, P. '!.
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outcomes of appraisals of existing assessment systems must be
evaluated by different standards. Since an assessment system is a
decisional system criteria for its appraisal must be reliable indicia
of the quality both of internal operations (including outcomes) and
external relationships. Criteria of internal operations of assessment
systems is deferred for later presentation in this paper. The analysis
presently being presented, focusing on significant contextual factors,
constitutes an effort to develop appropriate criteria for evaluating
the external relations of assessment systems...
Assessment-appraisals may be intended to assist a decisional
entity's performance of its appraisal function in general. If so,
criteria of adequate performance by that entity of its appraisal function
could also serve as appropriate criteria of adequacy of assessment outcome.
Such criteria might be the following; rigorous collection of scientific
information; continuousness (non- spasmodic); impartiality; contextual
in method; catharsis consequences; openness of participation; and
communication of outcome recommendations "to all politically relevant
strata of the population." 55
Finally, assessment outcomes commonly include recommendations for
policy making and implementation. If such recommendations are intended
to assist a decisional entity's performance of its recommendation function
in general, criteria of adequate performance of that function by the
decisional entity could also serve as appropriate criteria of assessment-
55
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra, note 7, p. 436.
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recommendations. Such criteria might be the following: the encourage-
meet of integrated policy (stressing common net special interests);
openness of channels of promotion to all participants; and use of strategies
of persuasion rather than strategies of coercion. 56
7. Effects
What effects upon society do we wish assessment processes and out-
comes to have? For convenience in exposition this question will be dis-
cussed in terms of impacts upon (a) social institutions; (b) the values of
the citizenry; (c) the physical, including the ecological, environment; 57
(d) basic decisional functions and basic structures of legal )rocess; and
(e) assessment systems and their participants. 58
Note that the question under discussion assumes that both assessment
processes and assessment outcomes may be causes of effects. Criteria of
system performance (assessment process) are one thing; criteria for
particular outcomes are another thing. Thus, because we have two different
k
sets of stimuli (causes) we are s:aarching for two different sets of criteria
of effects desired of such causes.
56.
M	 McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra, note 7, p. 421.
57
For a suggested classification of environmental consequences of
technological applications see Technology: Processes of Assessment
and Choice, supra_, note 2, p. 131-32. For a four-fold breakdown of the
overriding goal of improving the compatibility between man and his en-
vironment see Technical Information For Congress, s_u rya, note 2, p. 11.
58
A suggested classification of the effects of technological applications
appears in Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2,
pp. 135-38.
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(a) Social Institutions
That assessment processes and the outcomes of particular assessments
may have effects, desired and undesired, upon social institutions such
as the family, the school, the church, health-care, and social status is
clear. Because each such institution is an organized way of producing
values, they are themselves valuable. Moreover, each such institution
is sufficiently different to require a separate set of criteria for
evaluating impacts upon them, and sufficiently complex to require an
interdisciplinary approach to the problem of formulating criteria of
impacts upon them. finally, because social institutions tend to be
specialized to the production of particular values (although character-
istically producing all types of values), criteria of impact upon social
institutions should be related to and consistent with criteria of impact
upon values.
Beyond these quit.7 general observations what might be said about
criteria of impact urs ,an social institutions? First, existing policies
regarding each social institution potentially are a source of criteria
of impact for rssessment purposes. As an example, hom.stead exemption
and other prescriptions seeking to assure at least a minimum economic
b=^;.e for the family suggest that one criterion of impact should be the
effects upon this economic base. Not all existing prescriptions for the
family (or other social institutions) should be accepted as criteria of
impact for assessment purposes, of course, because some prescriptions are
inconsiste.:t with other criteria of adequate assessment proposed in this
paper.
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Second, specialists in the study of particular social institutions
(sociologists specializing in the family, for example) and the specialized
literature produced by such studies might be consulted for suggestions
about criteria of impact. Finally, attention should be given to current
public debates about roles of particular social institutions. To use
the family again as an example, current discussions about birth control
and the size of families suggest some criteria of impact upon that
institution.
(b) Values of the Citizenry
Citizens lay claim to an impressive variety of values, in varying
degrees of intensity, in different contexts, and through different
instrumentalities. These circumstances make it difficult to formulate
criteria of impact upon values. A method for simplifying and summarizing
this complexity is needed which highlights the most important values and
permits a contextual and comprehensive focus. Moreover, since people
relate to values both as producers (value-shapers) and as consumers
(value-sharers) this distinction might be maintained. In some instances
it may also be useful to establish minimum and maximum levels of shaping
and sharing values. Finally, attention should be given to the circumstance 	 z
that disciplined inquiry tends to be more or Less specialized toward
certain values (for example, the economist toward wealth and the
political scientist toward power).
On the foregoing reasons, perhaps as useful as any to be found are
.y
the following value categories proposed by Lasswell and McDougal: power;
wealth, skill, enlightenment, well-being, respect, recitude, and affection.
-t 
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These categories also have an additiol,al advantage for our purposes in that 
much policy respecting them already exists and is thus potentially a source 
of criteria of impact for assessment purposes. Again, as in the case of 
social institutions, specialists in the study of particular values, the 
specialized literature produced by such studies, and current public debates 
about desirable levels of shaping and sharing particular values can 
suggest criteria of impact upon values. 
To illustrate these general comments with respect to the value, 
wealth, a guaranteed annual minimum income recently has been proposed 
(mLimim sharing), and full employment (minimum shaping) has been 
ac~epted as national policy for more thar;. two decades. Income tax laws 
and prohibitions against monopoly illustrate policies about maximum 
sharing and shaping wealth. 
(c) The ~!&1?ical Envi:conment 
The complexity of the relationships of man and his physical and 
ecological environments demands some degree of scientific understanding 
as a requisite for stating criteria of impact upon environments. Although 
helpful very general criteria, such as enhancing the compatibility between 
man and his environment and avoiding irreversible changes in the environ-
59 
ment, must be supplemented by more specific and operational statements. 
In preparing such statements, while sciantific understandir.b is a necessary 
condition it is not sufficient; because desirable and un.desirable impacts 
59 
Technical Information For Congress, suprj!, note 2, p. 11; Tech-
no1ogy: Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, p. 3r.-
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upon physical anti ecological environments are determined by man's values 
and by his social institutions. Hence, the specification of criteria is 
here as in all cases a policy function, i.e. the prescribing function. 
(d) Basic Decisional l"unctions and Structures of Legal Process 
'Iwo levels of criteria are needed for the co~ .,equences of assessment 
processes 3nd outcomes upon basic decisional functions and structures of 
legal process. Fir.st, criteria are needed for aBs€:ssing the adequacy of 
performance of function and structures: in other words, viewing each 
function and each structure as part of a process and a system, how 
should they work? Second, lower level, more specific criteria are 
needed for particular problems processed by a decisional function. 
To illustrate the need of two levels of criteria consider the inte11i-
gence function. As a process-system it should be characterized by 
dependabi1ity,60 comprehensiveness, contextua1ity, availability, 
economy, and openness of participation. 61 As it processes a particular 
problem, however, an intelligence function should also conform to criteria 
of adequate resolution of that problem. Intelligence to assist the Con-
gress in deciding whether to enact a law, for example, should conform to 
60 
The dependability criterion is subdivided into five criteria in 
Technical Information For Congress, supra, note 2, pp. 514-15. 
61 
Respecting these criteria, compare McDougla, Lasswell, and Reisman, 
supra, note 7, p. 417, with Technical Information For Congress, supra, 
note 2, p. 513. 
----. .. ----
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criteria of adequate resolution of that problem. 62 Criteria of the
adequacy of continuing performance of the basic functions of intelligence,
promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal
already exist. 63 While lower level criteria of adequate resolution of
particular problems processed by appraisal, 64 intelligence, promotion, and
62
Respecting criteria for particular problems of prescription, see
Technical Information For Congress, supra ,note 2, pp. 2-4 and 474-75;
Jones, sutra, note 51, pp. 349-51.
63
Criteria for the intelligence function are stated, su ra,text, at
footnotes 53, 60, and 61. Criteria for the appraisal function are stated
.
supra, text, at footnotes 54 and 55. Criteria for the promotion function
are stated, supra, text, at footnote 56. Criteria for prescription func-
tions are: promptness in initiation, comprehensiveness, and contextuality
in exploration, conformity of prescriptive formulations to the basic
goal values of the community, and effectiveness in promulgative communica-
tions to the target audience. McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra,
note 7, p. 424. Criteria for invocation functions are: a balance between
promptness and efficiency, on the one hand, and adequate safeguards against
irremediable value deprivations on the other, contextual analysis, ratio-
nality in provisional characterization, restricted use of coercion, dis-
persal of authority and control, limitation upon access, and requirement
that application must follow. McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra,
note 7, at 427. Criteria for application functions are: promptness in
initiation, comprehensive contextuality in exploration, choice in decis-
ion which is both realistic as to fact and in conformity to inclusive
community policies, effectiveness and cost-consciousness in enforcement,
and comprehensiveness in policy analysis and projected effect in review.
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, su ra,note 7, at 430. Criteria for
termination functions are: ease, promptness, and availability in
initiation, comprehensiveness and dependability in exploration, cancel-
lation in accordance with community goal values, and effectiveness in
amelioration. McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, supra ,note 7, at 433.
64
Lower level criteria of appraisal problems are stated in the text,
p . 30.
1
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prescription functions have been proposed, 65 criteria are needed for
problems processed through invocation, application, and termination
functions.
(e) Assessment Systems
The reference here is to the assessment system being assessed and not
to the system doing the assessing. What consequences of assessment pro-
cesses and outcomes upon assessment systems being assessed are desirable
or undesirable? An assessment system must relate to its environment so as
to obtain the values necessary for its creation and maintenance. While
the desired relaLLons include economic resources for paying salaries,
making grants, conducting research, etc., other values are also essential.
Power is often necessary to obtain information, to review assessments of
other systems, to cope with competitors, and to present recommendations
to "front-line" or ultimate decision makers. 66 Personnel with requisite
skills and enlightenment are needed, although they may be secured in
part through contracting-out if power and funds for doing so exist. 67
65
Technical Information For Congress, supra, note 2 pp. 2-4 and
474-75; and Mayo and Jones, supra, note 51. pp. 349-50.
66
Concerning the need for "linkages" between assessment systems and
legislative and executive institutions, see Technology: Processes of
Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2 9 pp. 82--$3.
67
Concerning the expertise needed by assessment entities see Tech-
nology: Processes of Assessmen t and Choice, supra, note 2, p. 76.
r
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Respect from all sectors of the community for the competency, detach-
ment 4 impartiality, and open-mindedness of assessment systems is
needed. 68 Although commonly taken for granted the participants and
personnel of assessment systems must be assured of well-being and pro-
tected against physical and psychological assaults. Assessment systems
also must be able to enlist normative standards in supporting efforts
to enhance their reputations for competency, detachment, impartiality,
and open-mindedness, and to serve as spokesmen for common and inclusive
interests of the community.
In sum, since the availability of an adequate supply of base values
is essential for the creation and maintenance of assessment systems, an
important criterion of the effects of assessment processes and outcomes
is their impact upon the base values of the systems being assessed. In-
cluded among such base values are the benefits of criticisms of assess-
ment systems by competent, pluralistic, and out-side evaluators.
Another criterion relates to the effects of assessment processes,
especially outcomes, upon participants in the assessment system being
assessed. Since it will rarely be true that all participants will feel
equally indulged, and since some may experience feelings of extreme
deprivation, it is important that the shock of deprivation be con-
ditioned in some way. The style of presentation of findings and recom-
mendations can contribute to this end. So can acknowledgement of claims
denied if empathetic appreciation thereof is also sufficiently conveyed.
68
Concerning the importance of the confidence and cooperation of the
business community see Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice,
supra, note 2, pp. 76-77.
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Above all, findings and recommendations should reflect those qualities
of competency, detachment, impartiality, and open-mindedness essential
for maintaining the confidence of all participants.
It is also important that assessment processes and outcomes help
maintain the confidence of assessment systems being assessed. Assess-
meet processes and outcomes should also promote conformity by assess-
ment systems being assessed with the criteria proposed in this paper
for participants, perspectives, situations, base values, strategies,
outcomes, and effects. Often, for example, a system under assessment
will be found to act upon a limited perspective and apply a narrow set
of criteria of assessment. In such cases assessment processes and
outcomes should contribute to wider perspectives and more inclusive
assessment criteria of the entity under evaluation. A persuasive case
can be made for greater national coordination and control over assess-
ment entities. 69 Where this policy is sound assessment processes and
outcomes should promote national coordination and control.
Finally, assessment processes and outcomes should help the systems
being assessed to avoid or minimize adverse impacts of their assessments.
Assessments can exceed the limited attention span of decision makers and
produce information overloads. By focusing attention on some technologi-
cal applications, but not on others, assessments can help cause dis-
criminatory burdens to be cast upon the technologies assessed. By alerting
special interest groups too soon negative assessment strategies may be
69
Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2,
p. 77.
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mustered in successful opposition to desirable technological applications.
In some instances assessment may inhibit desirable technological innovation.
Assessments are particularly subject to the risk that the difficu]sies
of coping with unwanted side effects of technological applications will
be magnified, while possibilities that solutions will later be discovered
are ignored or minimized. Assessment systems may also be "captured" by
a special interest group. 70 Avoidance and minimization of risks such as
these is clearly desirable.
8. Criteria of Internal Operations
Another approach to the problem of adequate criteria of assessment
focuses upon the internal operations of assessment entities. 71 Operations
are conceived as sufficiently discrete to be subsumed under categories
and a flow chart is prepared of steps or sequences of categories of opera-
tions. By way of illustration a modified version of a flow chart of the
technology assessment function of the Congress will be used. See Figure
1 below. 72 While as originally conceived this flow chart made use of
70
Concerning risks of assessment, see Technology: Processes of
Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 84-89.
71
Respecting criteria of internal operations, see Vickers, The Art
of Judgment, (1965), pp. 157-169
72
The flow chart is found in statement of Louis H. Mayo in Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Intereovernmental Relations of the Committee
on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, on S. Res. 78, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., March 4, 5, 6, April 24, and May 7, 1969, at p. 120. The tech-
nology assessment capability of the Congress is also discussed In Tech-
nolo v: processes of Assessment and Choice, pp. 100-110; Technical
Information For Congress; and A Study of Technology Assessment, pp. 9-21,
all supra, note 2.
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eight categories (initiation, identification, specification, selection,
utilization, determination, evaluation, and modification), it is sufficient
for present purposes to reduce these to six: problem perception, problem
formulation, selection, utilization s determination, and evaluation. Pro-
ceeding seriatim criteria will be suggested for the adequacy of each opera-
tion.
(a) Problem Perception
The occasion for an assessment may be triggered by a statutory or
customary obligation of the Congress, or of one of its committees, or by
a social crisis or other stimuli. The important idea of tha category is
that somehow the Congress comes to perceive that a technology assessment
problem exists and merits attention. If the Congressional assessment
mechanism adopts a passive stance toward problem perception, waiting for
stimuli to come to it (except where a legal or customar y duty requires
it to search for problems), important problems of assessment (at least
until they have reached crisis proportions) and a representative sample
of problems of assessment are not likely to be perceived by the Congress.
To minimize these risks affirmative scanning or search strategies are
required. In other words, the operation of problem perception can be
evaluated in terms of its completeness, representativeness and timeliness.
Presumably not all problems of assessment perceived by the Congres-
slonal assessment mechanism would be permitted to appear on the Congres-
sional agenda . for decision making. Hence some screening of perceived
problems is required. The adequacy of the screening operation might be
te.;ted by the following criteria: the urgency of the problem; the lack
e- 53 -
of assessment efforts respecting the problem by other assessment entities;
the existence or lack of existence of another assessment- forum; the
appropriateness of the Congress as an assessment forum (for example, if
it cannot process the problem it ought not appear on its agenda); the
relationship of the problem to other concerns of the Congress; and the
nature of the problem (for example, problems of assessing existing
technology assessment systems might receive, initially at least, higher
agenda priority than problems of assessing past or future technological
73
applications).
(b) Problem Formulation
Since a problem is a disparity between existing and preferred con-
ditions, problem formulation requires a statement of existing conditions
(including trends in such conditions), a statement of preferred conditions,
a statement of criteria for determining preferred conditions, and an esti-
mate of the gap between existing and preferred conditions. 74
Criteria of adequacy of statements of existing conditions are: the
methodological soundness of fact collecting strategies; the accuracy of
73
For other formulations of agenda-criteria, see supra, note 2,
Technical Information For Congress, p. 474; Technology: Processes of
Assessment and Choice, p. 93; A Study of Technology Assessment, p. 5, 9,
10.
74
Mayo urges that adequate formulation of a social problem includes
delineation of the social subsystem encompassing the social interactions
and effects to be assessed. Since by definition a system (or subsystem)
has some capacity for coping with threats Lo its equilibrium or stability
it is not enough merely to trace impacts of outcomes to a social system.
The critical issue is: did the impact have sufficient "critical mass"
to produce permanent changes in the system, or did the system absorb and
neutralize the impact.
2
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the data; the comprehensiveness of the data; and the contextuality (in-
eluding the degree to which relationships with other institutions, programs,
and policy goals are reflected) of the data. It may sometimes be helpful
to include a classification of the particular technological application
75
to lie assessed.
Criteria for evaluating statements of preferred conditions (goals)
may come from numerous sources, including the constitution, statutes,
administrative regulations, case-law precedents, and conceptions of
policy goals derived from democratic ideology. Since problem formulation
ideally requires operational statements of preferred conditions such
statements also can be evaluated in terms of possibility of achievement,
degree of satisfaction of conceived needs, and, if preferred conditions
are also instrumental goals, how ultimate goals will be affected.
Criteria for evaluating criteria for determining preferred conditions
would include the criteria set forth above for evaluating statements of
preferred conditions. In addition such criteria might also include the
extent to which criteria for determining preferred conditions functioned
as such (for example, are the criteria sufficiently operational to deter-
mine preferred conditions?). Criteria for evaluating estimates of the
gap between existing and preferred conditions are the suitability of the
methodology and the soundness of its application.
If the problem formulated by the Congressional assessment mechanism
refers not to existing or prospective technological applications but to
N
75
See the six-fold classification in statement of Louis H. Mayo, supra,
note 72, pp. 114-115; and the tent-fold classification system suggested in
Technical Information "or Congress, supra, note 2, pp. 480-482. I
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the adequacy of an existing assessment system, meta-criteria (criteria of
criteria) are required. The notion of adequate assessment presented in
this paper proposes a set of meta-criteria,
(c) Selection
Selection refers tc the operation of choosing "information sources."
Perhaps a more descriptive reference is "intelligence sources," since more
than mere data or information is required. For example, the political
feasibility of a solution of an assessment problem might depend upon the
Congress permitting interest groups to contribute inputs of intelligence.
Selection involves a definition of the intelligence needed, determinations
of where it can be found and how it can be obtained, its dependability,
comprehensiveness, contextuality, economy, and probable contribution
to the resolution of the problem. Criteria of adequate selection wot;id
therefore test the adequacy of the definition of the intelligence needed,
of identification of its location and avilability, of methods of obtain-
ing it, and of its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness,
contextuality, economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution.
(d) Utilization
This operation refers to the decisional procedure used by the assess-
ment mechanism, and, unless they are prescribed, includes choices of the
procedures used. Choice of procedures and application of procedures chos(
may well be governed by different albeit interdependent criteria. Since
choice and application of procedures are instrumental. steps for reaching
decisional outcomes, criteria governing them should be causally related
to the qualities (criteria) sought of decisional outcomes. In other word:
or
•
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decisions choosing a decisional procedure, and decisions applying chosen
procedures might be tested by asking whether the procedure as a whole or
some aspect of its application helps or hinders realization of specified
qualities of outcomes. Decisions choosing a decisional procedure and
applying chosen procedures should also be governed by the nature of the
problem formulated (for example, whether assessment of a technolo,&ical
application, or an assessment of a technology assessment system), and by
the intelligence sources to be used (it may be preferable, for example,
that statistical data from unimpeachable sources be presented in docu-
mentary form). The number of participants as intelligence sources may
also influence choice and application of a decisional procedure.
(e) Determination
This operation refers to the process of arriving at decisional out-
comes and to the out(iomes themselves. The proc:ass of decision can be evalu-
ated by the criteria of BDM76 or by the following criteria proposed in
Technical information fer Congress: 
77 
what alternative solutions have been
advanced; what are the probable costs and undesirable side effects of each
alternative; what are the probable values and useful side effects of each
alternative; what are the economic and technical considerations relative
to each alternative; are the various alternatives feasible technically,
economically, politically; are all apparent alternatives politically or
technically unacceptable, thus requiring that additional alternatives
76
See text p. 38 and note 51, supra.
77
Supra, note 2, , p. 475. See also pp. 2-4
•i
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should be searched for; what are the implications of each alternative
for the short and long term; what contradictions are contained in the
information as receive-d; what bias and.indica.tions of unreliability
prejudice the information; what are the relative weights of the technical
conclusions and the information about political values pertaining to the
various alternatives after bias and unreliability have been screened out;
and what are the relative costs and benefits of adopting the preferred
alternative or of not taking action. 78
Outcomes are the end products of a process of -.^ • sessment. But these
end products may also constitute inputs to intelligence, promotion, pre-
scription, invocation, application, appraisal, or termination functions
of the Congress. When this is true criteria applicable to the Congress'
performance of these functions would also be appropriate criteria of out-
comes of a process of assessment.
(f) Evaluation
Since it refers to post-assessment appraisals of the impact of
. 
	,..._thIs_._q_aeration is an appraisal function and
should be evaluated by criteria applicable to the Congress' performance
79
of this function.
_..._...
	
78	 .	 - .. -----
For additonal criteria see Downs, su ra, note 45, pp. 175-176.
79
Criteria of appraisal are presented in the text, supra, pp. 30-31.
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IV. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ADVOCACY
Evaluations of advocacy commonly postulate the context of an adjudi-
catory arena governed by an adversarial decisional model, assume that all
advocates are lawyers, and focus upon the strategies of advocates. Con-
sequently, advocacy in non-adjudicatory areaas, the role of non-lawyers as
advocates, and advocacy as a mode of inquiry supporting intelligence and
other decisional functions remain implicit and obscure. Perhaps such
failures of evaluation are partly attributable to the commitment of some
disciplines (especially "pure" ones), professions and occupations (for
example, operations researchers, systems analysts, and management scientists),
and schools of thought (in the most extreme form, scientism) to inflexible
notions of "truth," "objectivity," and "neutrality." Explicit recognition
of advocacy as characteristic of all arenas, of advocacy by non-lawyer
participants, and of its role as a mode of inquiry would raise questions
,^.	 about claims to scientific validity, objectivity, and neutrality. And
the practice of labeling policy problems as "technical" or "scientific"
or "legal" might itself be recognized as a strategy of advocacy aimed at
enhancing the power and prestige of technicists, scientists, and legalists.
Some failures in evaluation of advocacy may also reflect a general
cultural bias (in particular a bias of academics) in favor of hierarchical
and pyramidal, unilateral controls as the preferable modes of coordinating
80
community life, and against bargaining-advocacy as a coordinating mechanism.
Finally, since bargaining-advocacy may be "illegal and much (though not all)
is extra--legal and is commonly condemned as the product of stupidity,
so See Lindblom, supra, note 12, pp. 2, 6-7, 28-29.
partiality, and avarice. . ."
How, then, does advocacy
strategies of claimants, when evaluated by representative sets of criteria
of adequate assessment?
1. Participant Criteria
Openness of participation as a criterion of adequate technology
assessment could hardly be achieved without some design for advocacy
as a mode of inquiry. Not only does openness look toward affording
opportunity for advocacy, but other participant criteria require in-
stitutaional arrangements that treat the strategies of claimants, col-
lectively, as part of the intelligence function and as a means of enhancing
the quality of assessments. Who is permitted to participate, the degree to
which participants are representative of the interests at stake, the timing
and form of participation, the contributions expected of participants - these
criteria presuppose an assessment design which institutionalizes advocacy as
a mode of inquiry. Moreover, quality assessments commonly require intel-
ligence which can be supplied only by advocates, as data about past and
future circumstances of participants, the value orientations of participants,
and the feasibility (political, economic, and technical) of recommended
alternatives for dealing with assessment problems.
While participant criteria presuppose a design for advocacy, other modes
of inquiry are not ruled out. Officials and other participants may inform
themselves by other means and may present their offerings in other styles
81
Lindb. ,m, supra, note 12, p. 3
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and forms. The essential point of a design for advocacy, however, is that
however participants inform themselves and whatever form and style of
presentation is used (including claims to speak as "experts" or in the name
of scientific validity), all presentations are open to challenge and attack
on any relevant ground. From this point of view advocacy is not comparable
to other modes of inquiry, because it transcends other modes. It does so
not by denying the contributions, but by providing a method for revealing
the strength and shortcomings of other modes, including itself as a mode.
Moreover, in practice other modes of inquiry, although aimed primarily to-
ward producing knowledge with certain qualities and employing tests such
as colleague consensus and inter-subjectivity, are heavily dependent upon
advocacy as an internal quality control mechanism. Advocacy thus builds
upon other modes of inquiry by providing the conditions under which they may
find most fruitful expression.
R	 2. Perspectives Criteria
Apparently officials cannot be assumed to supply the inclusiveness
of identification required for adequate technology assessment. 
82 
Nor
is it likely that any discipline, body of experts, professional or
82
"The fundamental premise	 is that bureaucratic officials . . .
are significantly -- though not solely -- motivated by their own self-
interests." Downs, supra, note 45, p. 2. See also Technology:
Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 24-28, 57-62.
1
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occupational group, 83 or governmental entity will always assert common
i
rather than merely special interests in technology assessments. It also
seems unlikely that the expectations of participants required for adequate
assessments (expectations, that is, of significant influence upon outcomes,
of decisional integrity, and of adherence to basic procedual rules) can
be created and maintained without employing advocacy as a mode of inquiry.
That claimants-advocates are partisan toward their own interests does
not necessarily mean that public interests are inadequately represented in
technology assessn ,. s. Assessment officials are not confined to the
partisan presentation of a single advocate (including, the presentation of
their own staff) as an intelligence source, but may consider all the
intelligence supplied, by whatever means, to their decisional system.
And the cumulative impact of narrowly, partisan presentations sharply
and precisely in opposition to one another often may spotlight the public
83
". . . professional groups, however conscientious, often have uncon-
scious commitments to the technology or technologies with which they are
associated and tend, with few exceptions, to make little difference in the
basic perspectives from which assessments are currently made." Technology:
Processes of Assessment and Choice, p. 25. "The dilemma of intelligence vs.
specialization is twofold: specialization is essential to the efficient
command of knowledge but antithetical to the penetrating interpretation
that bears on high policy; specialization and its concomitant, inter-unit
rivalry, frequently block the sharing of accurate information, but if pro-
blems of up-,yard communication can be solved, rivalry can result in great
gains -- the clarification of clashing alternatives and the presentation
of opposing cases. The primary cost of specialization in intelligence is
paroachialism -- the production of misleading or irrelevant information,
a product of the familiar limitations of the expert. The professionally
biased producer of intelligence remains too distant from the intelligence
user, too ignorant of policy needs, is forced to compete with other pro-
ducers for the support and guidance of the user . . . . The gain from
constructive rivalry is another matters it depends on administrative styles
and structures that expedite the free flow of rival perspectives and solutions
to the responsible executives and their general advisors." Wilensky, supra,
note 48, pp. 49-50. See also pages 162-164, especially note 60 on page 164
of Wilensky.
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interests at stake. Much depends, also, on expectations of claimants
that assessment decisions will he reached in a mechanical and legalistic
way, on the one hand, or will represent a conscientious effort to arrive
at a formulation of the public interest as seen from the broadest per-
spectives, on the other hand. When the latter expectations prevail
advocates realize that persuasive presentations must be related to and
shown to be consistent with policy needs.
3. Situations Criteria
In some settings constitutional or other legal prescriptions require
advocacy as a mode of inquiry in technology assessment. If such require-
ments do not exist, however, since assessment usually involves numerous inter-
actions among participants, provision must be made for such matters as
timeliness and sufficiency of notice of proceedings, the scope of matters
to be considered, the decisional standards to be applied, the kinds and
degrees of participation to be permitted, and the degree of support of
the basic decisional functions of the assessment system. These are matters
which make advocacy possible and, because of its long experience in con-
fronting them, advocacy is readily adapted to decisions respecting them.
4. Base Values Criteria
As a strategy of claimants and as a mode of inquiry advocacy's
contribution is conditioned by the effective means available for its
exercise. While this is also true of other modes of inquiry, advocacy
has a unique capacity for expanding and economizing the resources of an
assessment system. Base values are expanded because participants bring
values of all types into assessments. In particular, advocacy may lend the
aid of power to assessment outcomes; enlist the wealth of advocates (for)
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investigation, preparation, presentation, and other expenses); supply
needed standards of rectitude; contribute skill and enlightenment; reduce
alienation and increase social cohesion; and promote the health, safety,
and comfort of all persons participating in an assessment. To the extent
that advocacy augments it also economizes the use of the base values of
assessment systems.
That assessment practices and outcomes are influenced by the base
values of advocates is not, however, an unmixed blessing. Advocates rarely
are equally endowed with such means. In consequence some advocates may
be so richly endowed, as compared to others, that practices and outcomes
will be skewed against the public interest. The best possible counter-
balance for this possibility, however, may be to increase the influence
of opposing advocacy.
S. Strategies Criteria
As is true of other modes of inquiry advocacy can emphasize either
coercion or persuasion. Relative stress upon persuasion as against coercion,
in short, does not appear to be dependent upon modes of inquiry but Ripon other
variables, particularly the base values and perspectives of participants.
For example, as political power of advocates decreases greater reliance
tends to be placed upon the persuasive use of research findings; BG and
84
"Facts-and-figures men who command technical intelligence obviously
are given more discretion where the problems are technical. Less obviously,
they also carry more weight when the organization is weak in grass-roots
political resources. Among Washington lobbyists, for instance, repre-
sentatives of small organizations with limited political resources -- hu-
manitarian organizations, specialized trade associations -- accent research
in their lobbying strategy, in contrast to large-member organizations, such
as farm groups, veterans groups, and labor unions, who incline toward grass-
roots compaigns and publicity." Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 19.
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coercive strategies are reduced by creating expectations in participants
that only strategies of persuasion are likely to be influential.
Advocacy has a major contribution to make to minimum rationality in
assessment. Without it inclusive, balanced outcomes adequately reflecting
both common and minority interests appear impossible to achieve. Advocacy
also can contribute to and often is essential for the orderly development
of each component of policy judgments in technology 'assessment. Since
formulations of problems of assessment requires comparisons of present
conditions with criteria of the desirable and with projections of future
r.onditionp defined by such criteria, and conceptualization and proposal
of the social subsystem to be assessed, advocacy necessarily is involved.
This is also true of the prescriptive act of specifying goals.
While not so apparent, formulation of causal or probability links be-
tween technological applications and social impacts and between assessment
systems and social impacts inevitably requires advocacy. Suitable scientific
procedures for this component seldom exist. And even when a suitable science
is at hand and requisite controls can be used, discretion (hence advocacy)
is not necessarily eliminated. The most basic theories of scientific
disciplines are sustained (or undermined) by advocacy. 85 if a consensus
85
Kuhn, The Structures of Scientific Revolutions (1962). "In the popu-
lar view, science is a more disinterested and, therefore, better institu-
tion for uncovering truth. But major advances in scientific theory often
come from men insisting on opposing models of physical or social nature.
They are often polemical; their debate is sometimes carried on in the spirit
of armies at war, as Priestley's holding action against Lavoisier's theory
of chemical elements, Marx's invective about German idealism, and Weber's
insistence on the role of religious ethics in economic life all illustrate.
Three characterists of science, however, mark it as different from ad-
versary procedure and limit its use in everyday administrative life as well
as in the court. First, although individual scientists may be contentious,
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exists among scientists respecting a causal or probability relationship
in an assessment, it is supported by advocacy. 86 Such a consensus will
rarely exist in any event. $] Claims of scientific validity often amount
to no more than a "dialectic of expertise" 88 Moreover, the objects of
an assessment may be advocates with sufficient persuasiveness to co-opt
they are oriented more toward truth than power. The ,fudge or the official
must give some weight to political consequences of decisions; the scientist
is ideally oblivious of such considerations. Second, differences in science
are settled by colleagues; scientific truths lest ultimately on the con-
sensus of the competent. It is thus too technical for many administrative
purposes; the capacity to assess scientific truth is well developed only
among those immersed in its traditions and techniques. Finally, because
scientific propositions take a long time to establish, science is not an
ideal procedure for urgent organizational and ;judicial decisions. In short,
although adversary proceedings do not involve critical experimental tests,
they resemble science in their systematic regulation of the clash of views,
and they have the additional advantage of sensitivity to political interests,
greater availability to non-expert officials and judges, and speed."
Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. M
86
"The argument is that the existing machinery of scholar l y inquiry and
the process of mutual criticism tend to produce, over the course of time,
a collective produce, known as knowledge, which is relatively free of special
bias. No one, obviously, can say that this process even completely achieves, 	 z
its goal." Frankel, "Being in and Being Out," 17 The Public Interest 44, 58
(Fall, 1969).
	
i
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"The higher in the hierarchy one goes the less do prolAems correspond
to the specialized structure of knowledge and the less a decision can be
programmed. Only at the lower levels of policy deliberation can the special-
ized expert tackle a specialized problem with a chance of solving it by the
premise methods of science. Further, at any level, the role of the expert is
self-changing . . . . Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 46.
88
"Facts-and-figures men are preoccupied with rational argument and
criteria; their technical competence compels opposing parties to be more
careful or honest in the use of information to match each other expert for
expert, fact for fact." Wilensky, su ra,note 48, p.16.
E'
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the assessment itself. 89 Nor are assessment officials always models of
impartial detachment.90
Advocacy may assist in the invention or discovery of alternatives.
Since means-ends relations often are highly problematical, and since the
discovery of them often is highly creative and subjective, it is desirable
that parti.cipants advocate a variety of alternatives. Advocacy can con-
tribute to projections of outcomes. In fact all such projections if
made to influence policy making constitute advocacy. 
91 
Forecasts of
consequences of policy alternatives usually outrun consensus-based
bodies of scientific knowledge. Under such circumstances competing
projections by opposing advocates are to be encouraged. The evaluation
89
". . . Budget Bureau examines depend for information on the agency they
are assigned to investigate; the agency often converts the examiner into an
advocate of particular programs by a sensible even flow of information
(discounting the risk of disclosing weakness.)" Wilensky, supra, note 48, p.18.
90
". . . there is a kind of inbred tendency, in governmental reports,
to support existing policy. We possess an adversary system of government,
and an adversary press, and an international ideological struggle is going
on . Under these circumstances, reports tend to have a self-defensive
function. They accentuate the positive; they give the official what he needs
to defend policies that are under attack." Frankel, supra, note 86, p. 49.
91
"A forecast that a contemplated action will have this or that conse-
quencc is an argument for or against its adoption." de Jouvenel, The
Art o f Conjecture, (1967), p. 147
r
%
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of projected consequences may also be assisted by advocacy. Since the
use of standards of evaluation advocates their suitability for that
purpose (including the claims that consequences identified by them as
relevant merit evaluation and that consequences not identified by them
as relevant do not merit attention), and since competing evaluations
expose each other's limitations, advocacy is most useful.
It is true, of course, that when inappropriately channeled advocacy
can distort policy judgments. Incompetency in advocates, concealment
and exaggeration or minimization of relevant facts, the screening of
information through the categories of legal propositions sloughing-off
the "irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial," the presentment of frivilous
claims, creation of a "circus atmosphere", 92 exaggeration or minimizatiop
of anticipated social costs and benefits, mutual provocations of parti-
cipants, delayed decisions, and hasty and ill-advised decisions 93 -- each
92
"The deficienrles of adversary procedures are obvious. A circus at-
mosphere may develop as attorneys become preoccupied with press releases
rather than legal briefs, with courtroom histronics rather than reasoned
argument ("when you can't win a case, jaw it.") Wilensky, supra, note 48,
p. 152. Note that WV ensky is referring to advocacy by lawyers at trial
court levels of judi ,:.ial arenas, apparently before juries. Nevertheless,
becaupe he entertains a broader conception of advocacy he can recognize its
contributions: "But these limitations, not inevitable, are offset by the
overriding advantages of partisan advocacy, including the opportunity to
test the credibility of witnesses through cross-examination. In or out
of court, the adversary process is the best way to assure that assertions
are exposed to systematic scrutiny by men with countervailing interests who
are motivated to press hard." p. 152.
93
".	 bargaining in the wrong place at the wrong time accounts for
some of the worse aspects of American government. (1) It explains why
conflicting interests often result not in agreement but in the paralysis of
public policy, as is illustrated most dramatically by the filibuster. (2)
it also gives disproportionate power to the leaders of strategic minorities.
(3) It sometimes leads to the substitution of irrational agreement through
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of these may cause rationality to suffer. The need, therefore, is for
technology assessment entities to adopt procedures that enable advocacy
to make its optimum contribution to policy, yet safeguard the procedures
of persuasion and decision from disruptive side-effects. The criterion
of minimum rationality is not likely to be approximated without the use
of advocacy as a mode of inquiry.94
Finally, advocacy can promote the criterion that assessment outcomes
should assist the ultimate decision maker's performance of basic decisional
functions. Thus, it can test for qualities of dependability, comprehensive-
ness, and contextuality in intelligence functions; and for the rigor with
log--rolling for agreement upon some common goal. (4) It favors the most
highly organized groups." Lindblom, supra, note 12, p. 37. See also
Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 25-27
94
Lindblom's evaluation of advocacy (in particular, bargaining, which is
one form of advocacy) is interesting. He argues that advocacy-bargaining is
superior in many circumstances to any other alternative (in particular, su-
perior to hierarchial control) for ordering social affairs; that it is the
most feasible means for accommodating to the needs of social pluralism; that
because the bargaining power of an official depends in large part upon the
coincidence of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest
(defined as "the achievement of widely shared goals"), and because bargaining
power is largely determined through alliances with common interests, the
public interest is given operational meaning and promoted; that "the common
values of no significant group will be neglected in the final reconciliation
of values necessary for policy decisions" ("why the courtroom, the partisan
attorney, and the pursuit of victory instead of the study, the scholar, and
the pursuit of truth? Because, for all the miscarriages of justice in the
courts of law, we do not believe the researcher can give every man his due
or bring out every fact and value favorable to him." p. 28); that it aids
rationality in organizational contexts by supplying feedback about low level
decisions to top level policy makers; that it "motivates men to search ex-
haustively and ceaselessly for common goals" (". . . bargainers are highly
motivated to look and keep on looking, and to become resourceful in finding
hidden common goals. And, of course, the search for common values, even
where none are found, clarifies goals and reduces pointless conflict stemming
from mistaken self-interests." p. 31); and that it reveals wants and frustra-
tions that would pass unnoticed, thereby permitting adjustments of policy in
the light of them. See also Fuller's evaluation of advocacy in 1958 Proceed-
ings of the American ' Association of Law Schools, pp. 188-191.
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which scientific method is applied, the contextuality of the method,
and the impartiality of findings and recommendations in appraisal
functions. It can encourage integrated policy and reliance upon strategies
of.persuasion rather than coercion in promotion functions. It can promote
the promptness with which prescriptive functions are initiated, the con-
textuality of its explorations, and its conformity to basic goal values.
Respecting invocation functions advocacy can help achieve a proper balance
between promptness and efficiency in initiation of the process and in
maintenance of proper safeguards against irremediable losses, assure
contextuality of analysis, promote rationality in provisional character-
ization, minimize coercion, and demand immediate initiation of follow-on
application functions. Respecting application functions advocacy may
assist the promptness of initiation, the comprehensiveness and contex-
tuality of exploration, and the choice of decisions conforming to inclusive
community policies and capable of effective and economic enforcement.
Finally, respecting termination functions advocacy can promote the res-
ponsiveness of prescriptions to changes in social processes, help reduce
the cost of social change, encourage needed social change, assure comprehen-
siveness and contextuality in exploration, encourage cancellation in
conformity with community policies, and promote effectiveness in amelioration.
6. Outcomes Criteria
Assessments may be intended to produce (1) intelligence to assist
resolution of a particular policy problem; (2) appraisals assisting
another decisional entity's appraisal of the impact of a particular
policy; (3) appraisals of existing assessment systems; and (4) appraisals
of total impact assessments.
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Since previous discussion indicated how advocacy might contribute
to each component of a rational policy judgment, 95 (1), above, will not
be discussed. With respect to (2), above, assessments producing appraisals
to assist an ultimate decision maker's appraisal of the impact of a
particular policy should (2) define what is to be appraised; (b) trace
(establish cause and effect or probability relations) and describe the
consequences of the policy under evaluation; (c) formulate a conception
of relevant consequences sufficiently operational to serve as a guide in
tracing and describing effects; (d) posit a set of standards for evaluating
the quality of effects traced and described; and (3) report its "findings".
Advocacy may contribute to each of these standards.
Since definitions of objects of appraisal involve allocations of
scarce base values, influence other tasks of an appraisal, and determine
what is not to be appraised, rival definitions of objects of appraisal
are foreseeable and should be encouraged. We have seen that establish-
' 'ment*of' cause and effect or probability relations between particular
policies and their consequences seldom can be based on a science of
consequences, and even when so based, because consensus is essential
for scientific validity, advocacy contributes to the establishment
of that consensus and thus to the use of that science. Since conceptions
of relevant consequences are partly normative in nature and partly
intended as instrumental for tracing and describing (and since the
instrumental aspect usually out-runs scientific supports), advocacy
95
Text, 
'
supra ', pp. 37-38. The role of advocacy in aiding intelligence
functions in general is presented in the text, supra, pp. 21-24.
i
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can, does, and should contribute to them. To posit a set of standards
of appraisal is to advocate its appropriateness; alternative sets of
standards should be advocated before a set is posited. Finally, reports
of "findings" advocate their worth as findings; and, to the extent based
on inferences from evidence, advocacy can test the factual support of
findings.
Assessments producing appraisals of existing assessment systems,
(3), above, should be governed by criteria of appraisal constituting
reliable irdicia of the duality of the internal operations and external
relationships of the object of assessment. Advocacy's contributions
to the internal operations of an assessment system will be presented infra.96
The present analysis, characterizing external relationships and contexts
in terms of participants, perspectives, etc. is intended to indicate
advocacy's contribution in these respects.
	 ,
In practice total impact assessments must satisfy criteria for
evaluating the outcomes of other assessment systems, for relating out-
comes to a conception of total assessment, for a conception of total
assessment, and for coordinating the efforts of other assessment systems.
Advocacy may help meet these criteria. Its contribution to evaluations
of other assessment systems were noted supra. 97 It can aid the formulation
of conceptions of total assessment by explicating and critically evaluating
their most basic assumptions; and it can assist in relating outcomes of
96
See text, infra. pp. 74-76.
97
See text, supra, pp. 45-50•
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particular assessment entities to conceptions of total assessment by
explicating and critically evaluating the relational frameworks employed
to achieve syntheses. Finally, advocacy can enhance the quality of
efforts to coordinate the assessments of other systems. For example,
prescriptions of appropriate spheres of autonomy between assessing systems
and systems assessed are more likely to reflect inclusive community
perspectives if all perspectives are advocated.
7. Effects Criteria
The reference here is to desirable impacts upon social institutions,
the values of the citizenry; the physical and e:ological environment;
basic decisional functions and structures of legal process; and assessment
systems and their participants. Advocacy has contributions for each of
these areas.
Advocacy can help preserve and protect social institutions through
forecasts or appraisals of adverse impacts upon them, by insisting that
their uniqueness requires special, criteria of evaluation, by insisting
upon an interdisciplinary approach to evaluation of impacts, and by
noting their importance for the production of the values to which they
tend to be specialized. Moreover, advocacy is essential for the invocation
and application of existing prescriptions applicable to social institutions,
and it can be indispensable in critically evaluating current debates about
roles of social institutions and the contributions of specialists in
the study of particular institutions.
Respecting criteria of impact upon the values of the citizenry advocacy
can be indispensable for establishing minimum and maximum shaping and
I
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sharing criteria, in the invocation and application of existing prescriptions,
and in critically evaluating current debates about desirable levels of
shaping and sharing particular values and the contributions of specialists
in the study of particular values.
Formulation, invocation, and application of policy respecting impacts
of technological applications and assessment outcomes upon physical and
ecological environments involve policy functions which outrun the con-
tributions of scientific methods. How much of the fruits of pest-free
agriculture are we willing to forego in order to avoid certain effects
of DDT? Such questions raise policy issues in the resolution of which
advocacy is both inevitable and essential.
Since impacts upon basic decisional functions and structures of
legal process are impacts upon the policy making and implementation
process, itself, and since it is inevitable and essential to the process,
advocacy has a role.
With respect to impacts upon assessment systems and their participants,
advocacy and bargaining are essential strategies for creating and maintain-
ing relationships which assure a continuing flow t%f base values needed by
assessment systems. It can help maintain the confidence of all partici-
pants in the competency, detachment, impartiality, and open-mindedness
in assessing systems. It can help promote conformity by assessment
systems being assessed with criteria proposed in this paper. it can
promote national coordination and control over assessments. And, it
can help systems being assessed to avoid or minimize adverse impacts
of their assessments.
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8. Internal Operations Criteria 98
(a) Problem Perception
Advocacy can assist the completeness, representativeness, and
timeliness of problem perception. For example, by serving as a supple-
ment to scanning techniques permitting members of the general public to
call assessment problems to the attention of the Congress, advocacy might
contribute to completeness, representativeness, and timeliness of problem
perception. It can also contribute to agenda-making by aiding the for-
mulation of criteria of inclusion and exclusion and the interpretation
and application of such criteria.
(b) Problem Formulation
Statements of existing conditions, statements of preferred conditions,
criteria for determining preferred conditions, estimates of the gap between
existing and preferred conditions - each of these components of problem
formulation can be aid by advocacy. Respecting statements of existing
conditions it can test the methodological soundness of data collecting
strategies used, the accuracy of the data, and the comprehensiveness and
contextuality of the data. In statements of preferred conditions it
help establish the authoritativeness of criteria, contribute to estimates 	 i•
of feasibility, note discrepancies between statements of preferred and
conceived needs, and question whether preferred conditions, if instru-
mental goals, will achieve ultimate goals. The formulation of criteria
98
See text, supra, pp. 50- 59.
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for determining preferred conditions, since it is a prescriptive act,
can be assisted by advocacy, as can be interpretation and application
of such criteria. The suitability of the methodology and the sound-
ness of its application in estimating gaps between existing and pre-
ferred conditions can be tessted by advocacy. Finally, it can aid in
the formulation of meta-criteria for evaluating existing assessment
systems.
(c) Selection
Advocacy can help test the adequacy of the definition of intel-
ligence needed, in some instances aid in determining the location,
availability, or methods of obtaining that intelligence, and probe
its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness, contextuality,
economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution.
(d) Utilization
Decisions choosing procedures of assessment and decisions applying
procedures chosen can be aided by advocacy. If both types of decision
are to be evaluated in terms of their impacts upon assessment outcomes
advocacy is a useful means for establishing such impacts.
(e) Determination
If the process of arriving at decisional outcomes and the outcomes
themselves are to be evaluated by the criteria of BDM or by the set pro-
posed in Technical Information For Congress, 99 or by the criteria applicable
99
See text, supra, p. 56
41
to the performance of t
is a most useful tool i
Advocacy, then, is not only here to stay - its potential is so vast
and largely untapped that its future is quite speculative. We must work.
and hope that it will be used to establish a community in which the
dignity of man is honored in deed as well as in word.
